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REASON AND FAITH1 
Lara Buchak 
1. Introduction 
Faith is a central attitude in Christian religious practice.  The Christian typically sees it as her moral duty 
to have one or more of the following: faith in God; faith that God exists; faith that God is good; faith in 
the elements of various creeds; and faith that what God tells her is true.  The problem of faith and reason 
is the problem of reconciling religious faith with the standards for our belief-forming practices in general 
(‘ordinary epistemic standards’). 
In order to see whether and when faith can be reconciled with ordinary epistemic standards, we first need 
to know what faith is.  In this chapter, I will primarily examine views of propositional faith: faith that p.  
And I will primarily be concerned with the epistemology of such faith: what cognitive attitudes does such 
faith require, what epistemic norms govern these attitudes, and whether Christian faith can ever adhere to 
them.   
There are two tasks for an account of rational faith.  The first is to argue that the account fits the ‘data’ we 
have about faith: descriptions of faith in Scripture, intuitions about cases of having or lacking faith, 
linguistic practice regarding the term ‘faith’, the function of faith in religious and interpersonal practice, 
and feelings and attitudes associated with faith.  The second task is to show that faith in the relevant 
‘faith-propositions’ (the propositions that the Christian ought to have faith in) can sometimes meet our 
epistemic standards.    
However, there is widespread disagreement both about what our ordinary epistemic standards actually 
are, and whether, according to these standards, belief in God is rational.  (I will here use ‘rational’ to 
mean ‘meets the epistemic standards’, whether these standards are a matter of justification, warrant, 
intellectual virtue, reasonableness, or something else.)  For our purposes here, there are two important 
axes along which epistemologists disagree.  The first axis is whether truth-directed reasons are enough for 
a rational subject to believe (or reject) the faith-propositions.  Some hold that arguments and evidence are 
enough to show that God exists, or that God does not exist; while others hold that arguments and evidence 
still leave open the question of God’s existence.  The second axis is whether rational beliefs can ever be 
sensitive to reasons that are non-truth-directed.  Some hold that what an agent should believe is fully 
determined by truth-directed reasons.  Others hold that non-truth-directed reasons can rationally make a 
difference to what a subject believes—or, indeed, must rationally make a different to what a subject 
believes—when truth-directed reasons leave it underdetermined what she should believe.   
Accounts of faith can be divided into three types, based on the cognitive attitude that faith requires.  Some 
hold that faith that p requires belief that p, and I will call these doxastic accounts.  Others hold that faith 
only requires a weaker belief-like attitude, such as acceptance, and I will call these weakly-doxastic 
accounts.  Finally, some accounts hold that the primary attitude involved in faith is something entirely 
different, such as hope or commitment to an action—I will call these non-doxastic or practical accounts.  
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(Many accounts of all three types include the additional condition that faith requires a pro-attitude, such 
as desire, towards the truth of the proposition in question.)   
 
Our taxonomy will be organized both according to the type of cognitive attitude that faith requires, and 
the two epistemic axes mentioned.  Before we begin, three caveats.  First, I am primarily examining 
accounts of Christian faith, although most of these accounts are meant to apply to other cases of religious 
faith and cases of mundane faith as well.  Second, any taxonomy will be imperfect, and several of these 
accounts have multiple possible interpretations; nonetheless, I hope to capture the essential divisions 
between the accounts.  Finally, I am concentrating here on the rationality of faith in a static rather than 
dynamic sense: what it is to have faith in a proposition at a time, and how such faith is arrived at or 
justified at that time.  Many accounts of faith add that faith is robust in the face of counterevidence, and 
although I will mention this feature in conjunction with several accounts, I do not have space to discuss it 
fully. 
 
2. Doxastic Accounts of Faith, Truth-Directed Epistemologies 
We will first examine doxastic accounts of faith that all share a particular view in epistemology: that 
truth-directed reasons are conclusive in determining that a subject should believe (or not believe) the 
faith-propositions.   
2.1 Faith as Belief in Faith-Propositions 
The first of these views is fairly widespread: faith is just belief in the relevant faith-propositions. 
Swinburne (1981) says that the Fathers of the Council of Trent developed this view—he calls it the 
Thomistic view, but notes that it is widespread among Catholics, Protestants, and many outside 
Christianity.  (One could add that faith is belief plus something else.  For example, what Swinburne calls 
the Lutheran View holds that faith also requires that one trust God and commit oneself to God, though 
since my concern is in distinguishing views of faith by what they require epistemically, I won’t 
distinguish these two views here.)  Indeed, that this view is widespread is illustrated by the fact that it is 
sometimes left implicit: some authors defend faith that God exists by arguing that it is rational to believe 
that God exists, without explicitly defining faith; and others reject faith that God exists by arguing that it 
is irrational to believe that God exists. 
What theistic authors who hold that faith is just belief in faith-propositions have in common is that they 
think all or some of us have good, objective epistemic reasons to believe in God.  For example, they may 
hold that natural theology is successful and therefore that we can reason to God’s existence on the basis of 
what we know about the world around us.  Or they may hold that for those people who have had religious 
experiences, these experiences make it rational for their possessor to believe in God.  Alternatively, 
atheistic authors who hold that faith is just belief in faith-propositions may hold that no one has 
conclusive truth-directed reasons to believe in God—that faith is always irrational. 
2.2 Faith as Belief Formed via Testimony 
Other accounts of faith that adhere to truth-directed epistemologies hold that faith is belief that is formed 
in a particular way, or that has a particular basis.  One such account holds that faith is belief on the basis 
of testimony: one has faith in a person if one relies on that person’s testimony in forming beliefs, and one 
has faith in a proposition if one believes that proposition on the basis of someone else’s testimony.  So, to 
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have faith that p is to believe that p on the basis of testimony—as Anscombe puts it, to believe someone 
that p.  Proponents of this account include, historically, Augustine (391) and Locke (1698), and more 
recently, Anscombe (1975, 1979), Zagzebski (2012) and Dougherty (2014); furthermore, Aquinas (1265-
74) discusses at least two senses of faith, one of which is deference to testimony.  Versions of this account 
can be more or less restrictive about what counts as faith.  They can hold that the testimony itself must 
come from God (or be believed to come from God) in order for the resultant attitude to properly count as 
faith, or alternatively that believing based on testimony in general always counts as faith.  Similarly, they 
can hold that the attitude is properly called faith only if the content of the attitude—the propositions in 
which one has faith—is religious in nature, or they can be more permissive. 
On these accounts, whether a particular instance of faith is rational will hinge on the circumstances under 
which it is rational to accept testimony more generally.  In particular, it will hinge on whether belief 
formed via testimony is just an application of ordinary epistemic practices, with testimony playing no 
special role, or, if testimony is to be treated differently than other sources of belief, whether testimony is 
superior, inferior, or on a par with ordinary reasoning.  Hume (1748) takes the view that believing via 
testimony is largely an application of our ordinary reasoning process (induction): in our experience, 
testimony is generally reliable, though it ought to be rejected when we have better (inductive) reason to 
suppose that it is false.  Locke and Augustine distinguish between the epistemic status of testimony and 
other kinds of reasoning.  Locke takes the view that it is better to understand truths through use of our 
own reason rather than to take someone else’s word for it, and that deferring to others’ opinions often 
prevents us from employing our own reason, so that testimony is an inferior source of knowledge; 
whereas Augustine holds that we might need to defer to someone else’s opinion in order to understand a 
truth (we need to ‘believe in order to understand’), so that testimony is often a necessary source of 
knowledge.   
2.3 Faith as Belief Formed via a Sense of the Divine   
A different view according to which faith is belief formed in a particular way claims that faith is belief 
formed on the basis of an innate faculty or ‘divine sense’.  To hold that such faith is rational is to hold that 
belief in religious propositions needs no articulable, publically accessible justification.  This position is 
associated historically with Calvin (1536) and contemporarily with Plantinga (1983, 2000).   
To understand Plantinga’s view, it is helpful to understand his epistemology.  He is a foundationalist and 
an externalist.  Foundationalists distinguish between basic beliefs—those that need no further 
justification, as long as there are no positive reasons to reject them or to worry about their source—and 
non-basic beliefs—those that are justified by other beliefs, in a chain which can eventually be traced to 
beliefs in the foundations.  For example, beliefs formed on the basis of perception (e.g. that the cat is in 
front of me) may be basic and thus in need of no further justification, and beliefs inferred from this belief 
(e.g. that the cat is not in the yard) are justified insofar as they are correctly inferred from other justified 
beliefs. Externalists hold that what makes a belief justified can be external to the subject—some fact 
about the world or about the subject vis-à-vis the world, rather than some fact only about the subject 
himself.  For example, what makes my basic belief justified is that my perceptual faculty is working 
correctly, regardless of whether I have good evidence for this fact or know precisely how perception 
works.   
Foundationalists must answer the question of which beliefs are basic and why.  Plantinga holds that a 
belief is basic if it was produced by a belief-forming process functioning properly in the environment in 
which it was designed to function.  For example, vision is a reliable belief-forming process that generally 
functions properly in our world.  Following Calvin, Plantinga claims that if the Christian story is true, 
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then God has implanted in us a very particular reliable belief-forming process: a ‘sense of the divine’, 
which, when activated in the right circumstances—e.g. when we see something of great beauty—
produces beliefs such as ‘God loves me’ and ‘God created this’.  These beliefs are thus basic and justified, 
and from them we can infer other propositions, such as that God exists. 
Whether Plantinga is correct that beliefs formed in this way are rational depends on a number of factors.  
First, it depends on whether we indeed have a sense of the divine, which in turn depends on whether God 
in fact exists—Plantinga explicitly notes that the rationality of belief in God, on his picture, depends on 
whether this belief is true, but argues that this poses no special problem.  Second, it depends on whether 
we accept Plantinga’s foundationalist, externalist epistemology.  Finally, even if we do accept his 
epistemology, then although religious beliefs are basic, it will still be irrational to hold onto them if we 
have positive reason to think these beliefs are false (‘defeaters’) or special reason to think that the faculty 
that produced them was working incorrectly at the time (‘underminers’)—so the rationality of religious 
beliefs can still be undermined by, for example, the problem of evil or the problem of disagreement. 
2.4 Faith as Believing in the Absence of Sufficient Justification 
There is one final category of truth-directed epistemologists who have a doxastic view of faith: those who 
hold that truth-directed reasons are insufficient for belief in the faith-propositions and hold that faith, 
then, is a matter of believing in the faith-propositions against what the evidence dictates or in the absence 
of sufficient justification.  Or, if the account is generalized to include mundane cases of faith, they hold 
that faith is generally a matter of believing a proposition in the absence of sufficient evidence.  In other 
words, they hold that faith fills the gap between evidence and belief, but that this gap ought not to be 
filled. 
Many who hold this view of religious faith are detractors of religion—it seems to be a common view 
among the ‘New Atheists’.   However, one can hold this view and also hold that religious (or mundane) 
faith can be virtuous in some respects, if one thinks that faith should not be judged primarily by epistemic 
standards but instead by the standards of morality or practical rationality.  For example, one might hold 
that is it noble or morally virtuous to believe in the innocence of one’s friend despite all evidence to the 
contrary, even though doing so is not epistemically virtuous.  Similarly, one might hold that there is 
something good about believing in God, even when it is epistemically irrational to do so. 
2.5 Epistemological Issues 
Since all of these accounts hold that truth-directed reasons alone dictate the doxastic attitude an individual 
should take towards the faith-propositions, the primary epistemological questions for these accounts 
concern what these reasons actually say about the faith-propositions.  This is not the place to wade into 
this debate, so I refer the reader to the myriad discussions of reasons and arguments for God’s existence, 
reasons and arguments against, and reasons that we ought to suspend judgment.  
 
3. Doxastic Accounts of Faith, Broader Epistemologies 
Some accounts hold that faith that p requires belief that p, but that rational belief is sometimes responsive 
to non-truth-directed reasons when truth-directed reasons are not decisive—and, in particular, that this 
holds when it comes to belief in faith-propositions.  These accounts locate faith as the attitude that fills 
the gap between evidence and religious belief.  To show that such faith is rational, they must explain why 
and how non-truth-directed reasons can rationally affect what an individual believes.  They also must 
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explain how non-truth-directed reasons can psychologically cause belief, since our ordinary picture of 
belief is one on which beliefs are resistant to being formed for reasons other than that we think them true. 
3.1 Faith as Belief Fostered by the Will 
We begin with Aquinas’s (1265-74) second account of faith.  (As mentioned, Aquinas gives an account of 
at least two senses of faith, the other being belief on the basis of testimony.)  In order to understand how 
Aquinas thinks about religious beliefs, we must understand how he thinks beliefs are formed and justified 
generally (I follow Stump’s (2003a, 2003b) interpretation here). To understand this, it is important to see 
how Aquinas understands the will.  The will is not an entity that actively makes choices, but rather an 
inclination for goodness: when the will apprehends something as good, the will cannot help but will it, 
just as a plant cannot help but be drawn to the sunlight.  Thus, a person acts ‘under the guise of the 
good’—he does things that he sees as good under some description—and a person cannot help but see 
happiness in this life and God in the next life as good.  
Aquinas also discusses the relationship between the intellect and the will.  The intellect is typically what 
judges a course of action as good, and it then presents this course of action to the will as good.  The will 
can direct the intellect—direct it to adopt or reject a belief, or to think about certain things or avoid 
thinking about others—but it cannot direct the intellect against the way it normally works—it cannot, for 
example, direct the intellect to adopt a belief it knows to be false.  Given this picture, belief can be 
brought about in two different ways: if epistemic considerations are decisive, belief can be brought about 
by the intellect alone; and if they are not, belief can be brought about by considerations that move the 
will.  Belief brought about by the will is psychologically possible because the will produces beliefs in a 
way that is not directly under our control, and because the will can only work in accordance with the 
intellect. 
Aquinas does hold that there is epistemic justification for the belief that God exists.  However, he also 
holds that many people are not in a position to know this, and thus believe by faith instead.  To have faith 
is to assent to the faith-propositions in the second way mentioned above: a person who has faith assents to 
these propositions on the basis of considerations that move the will, namely that believing these 
propositions presents itself to the will as good.  In addition, a person who has formed or salvific faith (the 
faith of the Christian, rather than the faith of the devils) must be moved to assent to them by the right 
motivations—by a hunger for God’s goodness, rather than by a love of power. 
Aquinas additionally argues that faith is rational, but not because believing propositions on the basis of 
the will rather than the intellect is generally rational, but because the faith-propositions themselves entail 
that believing in this way is in fact truth-directed—his argument for this is complex, and rests on the 
connection between being and goodness.  (For this reason, we might place this account of faith in the 
previous section, since it endorses believing for what turn out to be truth-directed reasons, but since the 
path is roundabout, I place it here.)  Although non-truth-directed reasons arising from the will don’t 
generally make a belief rational, in the particular case of the faith-propositions, the reasons arising from 
the will are (surprisingly) truth-directed. 
3.2 Faith as Doxastic Venture 
Doxastic venture views hold that the will can take over when reason is not decisive, but they typically see 
the will as a mechanism for choice rather than a passive response to goodness.  Perhaps the most famous 
doxastic venture view is that of Pascal (1660) in his famous Wager.  Pascal argues that if reason cannot 
decide the question of whether God exists, then we are rationally required—from the point of view of 
practical rationality—to believe in God, since a decision-theoretic analysis shows that believing in God is 
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better than not believing in God or remaining agnostic.  Pascal gives three separate decision-theoretic 
arguments, but the most famous one says that since believing in God yields ‘an infinity of an infinitely 
happy life’ if God in fact exists, then believing in God has a higher expected value (infinite expected 
value) than not doing so (finite expected value).  Belief in God is also morally permissible, since by 
believing, one will attain moral virtues, whether or not God exists.  
Pascal appears to hold that belief in God on the basis of the pragmatic considerations adduced by the 
Wager is also psychologically possible.  This is because he seems to see unbelief as primarily caused by 
sin: in response to the worry that we cannot believe in God at will, he exhorts us to have Masses said and 
take Holy water so that we may remove unbelief.  Adams (1987a) makes a similar point about an 
individual involved in the sin of unbelief (lacking faith), though he concentrates on Christians who resist 
believing and acting on some truth that God is telling them.  He argues that unbelief is a sin precisely 
because this resistance is the result of an emotional failing, for example, wanting control.  So, for Pascal 
and Adams, rather than faith filling the gap between evidence and belief, a lack of faith creates a gap 
where there needn’t be one.  Thus, the will is primarily involved in removing irrational unbelief.  This 
explains both why belief in God is psychologically possible and why it is epistemically rational. 
James (1896) holds that the will can play a role in belief when epistemic considerations are not decisive, 
and that it is the believer’s situation that makes relying on the will rational.  By the will, James primarily 
means non-epistemic considerations that influence belief (our ‘passional nature’), though he clarifies that 
these considerations come before the intellect has examined all of the evidence—this is why taking these 
considerations into account is psychologically possible.  When epistemic considerations are not decisive, 
and when the decision of whether to believe something or not is genuine—one cannot avoid choosing 
between two or more hypotheses that are each plausible and there is a great deal at stake in the choice—
then the will not only may, but must decide whether to believe something, believe its negation, or suspend 
judgment.  One particular consideration that James singles out as not determined by reason alone is how 
much evidence one needs to believe a proposition, which he holds is determined by how our passional 
nature weighs the goal of knowing truth against the goal of avoiding error.  A focus of James’s argument 
is that there are practical consequences associated with failing to believe something true, just as there are 
practical consequence associated with believing something false. 
Bishop (2007) takes James’s insights, plus the idea that faith essentially involves a risky act, as his 
jumping-off point in his doxastic venture view of faith.  When we lack adequate evidential support for 
both a proposition and its negation, we are sometimes entitled nonetheless to believe the proposition and 
to give it full weight in our practical reasoning.  When these three conditions hold—we recognize that we 
lack adequate evidential support for a proposition, we give the proposition full weight in our practical 
reasoning, and we do so while believing the proposition to be true—then we have faith in the proposition. 
Bishop’s epistemology largely follows James’s. One is epistemically entitled (though not required) to 
have faith that p if—and because—whether to take p as true in one’s practical reasoning is essentially 
undecidable by the evidence alone and whether to take p as true in one’s practical reasoning is a genuine 
choice (in James’s sense).  Bishop calls principles about what counts as evidence for what framing 
principles, and he calls framing principles that concern the most fundamental evidential connections 
highest-order framing principles.  Framing principles present genuine options, and highest-order framing 
principles are essentially undecidable by the evidence alone.  Furthermore, some of the faith-propositions 
are highest-order framing principles.  (To see this, notice that how to take the claims of the Bible into 
account in forming our beliefs about the world depends on whether we think these claims were inspired 
by God.)  Thus, faith in these propositions meets the criteria for epistemically rational faith.   
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A final view in this vein comes from a popular interpretation of Kierkegaard’s (1843) pseudonym 
Johannes de Silentio.  According to this interpretation, religious faith requires believing something that is 
irrational or absurd, and yet religious faith is the highest possible thing a person can aspire to.  Similarly 
for Kierkegaard’s (1846) pseudonym Johannes Climacus, as Adams (1987b) understands him: faith 
requires total commitment to a belief, the kind of commitment that could not in principle be arrived at 
rationally via evidence, precisely because reason always leaves room for some doubt or future revision.  
(Whether faith, on this view, counts as merely filling the gaps in the evidence, or believing something that 
positively ought to be disbelieved, depends on how we are to interpret the status of the objective 
evidence.)  Here, it is not that faith ends up epistemically justified, but that epistemic justification is the 
wrong criteria to apply to faith, since faith is something higher. 
Bishop’s model captures the idea that faith involves a risk.  Since the person who has faith that p gives p 
full weight in his practical reasoning while recognizing that p is not fully supported by evidence, he will 
act in a way that seems less than fully justified.  Similarly, even though other doxastic venture models 
might not explicitly mention action, insofar as every belief one holds has the potential to issue in action 
(see Clifford (1877)), they seem to recommend acting in a way that one is not (at least initially) fully 
confident in on the basis of epistemic reasons alone.  And, since action is evaluable according to practical 
and moral standards, we can, in addition to asking whether having faith is epistemically rational, ask 
whether and when having faith is practically rational or is morally laudible.   
3.3 Faith and Theory Choice 
Authors who take scientific inquiry as a model for individual epistemology echo Bishop’s point that 
highest-order framing principles are generally underdetermined by evidence. Van Fraassen (2002) and 
Murphy (1990) each draw on an account of how science progresses, Kuhn’s (1970) account and Lakatos’s 
(1970) account respectively, to explain why individuals might believe faith-propositions. Van Fraassen’s 
aim is not to defend religious beliefs, so his mention of them is more in passing, but Murphy’s aim is to 
defend religious beliefs.  (Neither explicitly gives an account of faith, but since both give accounts of why 
we might rationally believe faith-propositions without decisive evidence, they are worth including in this 
discussion.)   
Kuhn and Lakatos reject the naïve view that science is a discipline in which progress is primarily linear 
and a growing body of knowledge is continually added to.  Instead, they hold that scientific progress is a 
battle between successive (Kuhn) or simultaneous (Lakatos) paradigms.  A paradigm involves high-level 
concepts, laws, theories, and instrumentation, on the basis of which data is interpreted; in addition, what 
count as data is partially determined by which paradigm one accepts.  According to Kuhn, which 
paradigm a scientist accepts is a matter of non-evidential factors: scientists may begin in one paradigm as 
a matter of historical accident, maintain it dogmatically, and change paradigms when a crisis arises (for 
example, an inability to solve a persistent problem).  Lakatos sees science as a series of competing rather 
than successive paradigms, and holds that there are often objective epistemic reasons for choosing one 
paradigm over another, namely that one is more progressive: it has a better record of modifying itself in 
response to challenges in such a way that it predicts novel facts. 
Van Fraassen and Murphy take the view that individual belief-formation is analogous to science, and they 
hold that faith-propositions are components of high-level research programs that one might adopt or 
reject.  Van Fraassen holds that one will change ‘individual’ paradigms (undergo a conversion to or away 
from religious beliefs) through experiencing a crisis in one’s current beliefs, where emotion is the primary 
factor that resolves the crisis.  Murphy holds that such a change can be driven more by epistemic factors: 
one changes individual paradigms when evidence shows that one’s current paradigm is less progressive 
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than an alternative.  (Notice that since one always has some reason to continue working in one’s current 
paradigm rather than switch, these views provide a ready-made answer to why religious beliefs, once 
adopted, should be somewhat robust in the face of counterevidence.) 
In combination with Bishop’s view that religious faith involves taking a stance on highest-order framing 
principles, we can use these authors’ insights to fill in particular reasons that one would adopt the faith-
propositions.  On van Fraassen’s account, the religious person might find herself adopting faith because 
of an emotional upheaval brought about by incongruences and failures in her previous belief system, and 
on Murphy’s account, the religious person might hold the view that a particular set of faith propositions 
constitutes a progressive research program—when these form the core of her thinking, she tends to do 
well at understanding the world around her and predicting how things will go, and when they don’t, her 
understanding of the world around her is filled with ad hoc hypotheses and not much predictive power.  
3.4 Epistemological Issues 
The accounts of faith in this section will appeal to those who hold that although evidence for religious 
propositions is not decisive, believing religious propositions can nonetheless be rational.  However, these 
accounts raise additional questions. 
First, can it be epistemically permissible to believe a proposition partially for non-truth-directed reasons?  
If we think that belief aims at truth, then why should we allow belief to be influenced by something other 
than truth?  To put the worry metaphorically: if responding to evidential considerations gets us closer to 
the goal of attaining truth, doesn’t responding to non-evidential considerations at best move us 
orthogonally to the goal, and at worst move us away from the goal?  These accounts also raise an 
additional question: is it even possible to believe for reasons one recognizes to be non-truth-directed?  
(Can we intentionally move in any other direction than towards the goal?)   
The accounts that we’ve seen answer these questions in different ways.  Aquinas holds that we can be 
pulled by both our intellect and our will, and that being so pulled is largely a matter of how these two 
faculties function rather than conscious choice.  Our intellect can only pull us towards the goal, and while 
our will is not so restricted, in the particular case of belief in God, it turns out that the pull that we feel 
towards believing the faith-propositions is actually a pull towards truth.  Pascal and Adams hold that we 
can only indirectly be moved by our will—by non-truth-directed reasons—but that in the case of the faith 
propositions, to subject ourselves to the indirect influence of our wills is to release ourselves from the 
forces that pull us away from truth.   
James, Bishop, van Fraassen, and Murphy all hold that the picture of responding to evidence as 
responding only to truth-directed reasons is mistaken, and that if we are to believe anything at all, we 
must adopt certain principles before forming any conclusions about what the evidence suggests.  Thus, we 
must first locate ourselves somewhere and then try to aim at truth from that point.  While what determines 
our location can be more or less intentional—it could be a historical accident, a matter of passion or 
emotion, or a conscious move from a different starting point—we cannot help but start from a location if 
we are going to engage in the project of truth-seeking in the first place.  So, there will be nothing 
epistemically objectionable about starting from some particular point, although given this fact, the choice 
of starting points is also open to moral and prudential evaluation.  Murphy’s extra-evidential factor is 
perhaps the only factor that turns out to be, in the end, epistemic, though even on her view one still needs 
to start somewhere. 
So, religious faith is distinguished from wishful thinking by Aquinas, Pascal, and Adams because faith 
allows us to have what are in fact justified religious beliefs; and it is distinguished from wishful thinking 
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by James, Bishop, van Fraassen, and Murphy because religious beliefs are of the high-level type that 
evidence cannot, or cannot directly, settle.  
 
4. Weakly-Doxastic Accounts of Faith  
Weakly-doxastic accounts hold that faith requires adopting a belief-like attitude—a positive cognitive 
stance—but an attitude that is less committal than belief.  This is sometimes put by saying that faith is a 
sub-doxastic venture.  These accounts are partially motivated by the thought that belief is not under direct 
voluntary control, but that closely-related cognitive attitudes are.  Since an individual’s evidence may not 
decide whether the faith-propositions are true, and belief that p cannot coexist with belief that the 
evidence does not decide whether p, but faith requires a positive cognitive stance towards the faith-
propositions, then the required cognitive stance must not be belief.  All of the accounts in this section 
identify the cognitive stance that faith requires to be something weaker than belief; however, all but 
Schellenberg’s also hold that if the individual does believe, then that is sufficient for the ‘cognitive 
stance’ requirement of the account: what is required for faith is that one have belief or the weaker attitude 
identified. 
Golding (1990), and Buckareff (2005) following him, notes that being religious entails pursuing a good 
relationship with God.  Thus, the required cognitive stance for faith is pragmatic assumption that God 
exists for the purpose of pursuing a good relationship with God.  Pragmatically assuming that p is only 
rational if one believes that there is at least some chance that p (presumably, a very low epistemic bar to 
meet in the case of pragmatically assuming that God exists).  In addition, as long as the goal is not 
immoral, then pragmatically assuming that p for the sake of some goal is morally permissible; and as long 
as pragmatically assuming that p is instrumental in achieving the desired goal, then doing so is practically 
rational.   
Alston (1996) identifies a slightly different attitude as the required cognitive stance for faith: Cohen’s 
(1992) notion of acceptance.  Acceptance differs from belief in two crucial respects: acceptance that p 
does not require that one have a high degree of felt certainty that p; and acceptance is under our direct 
voluntary control.  Like belief that p, acceptance that p requires that one use p as a premise in theoretical 
and practical reasoning.  Alston’s full analysis of faith is that faith involves a weak epistemic position 
with respect to p (this may not be required, though it is a feature of central cases of faith), a pro-attitude 
towards p (e.g. one wants p to be true) and a cognitive attitude towards p which could either be belief that 
p or acceptance that p.   
The cognitive stance that Schellenberg (2005, 2014) identifies is imaginative assent.  One imaginatively 
assents to p if one deliberately represents the world to oneself as including the truth of p; if one intends to 
be mentally guided by this picture of the world on an ongoing basis; and if one follows through and does 
so. Faith that p requires that one have a pro-attitude towards p, that one doesn’t believe not-p, and that one 
imaginatively assent to p.  (For Schellenberg, faith that p is incompatible with belief that p.)  
Howard-Snyder’s (2013) account shares features with the above accounts, but takes a broader view about 
what the relevant cognitive stance is.  He holds that faith that p requires a positive evaluation of p, a 
positive conative orientation towards p, a positive cognitive stance towards p, and resilience to new 
counterevidence to p.  He adds that for each of the first three elements, there is no single attitude that is 
required; for example, the positive cognitive stance can be belief that p or acceptance that p or assumption 
that p.  
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All of the above, except for Schellenberg, hold that propositional faith that can be realized in a number of 
different ways, since the cognitive stance involved in a particular case of faith can be belief or something 
weaker.  Audi (2011), on the other hand, allows that a person with faith can either believe or take a 
weaker cognitive stance, but that these are two different kinds of propositional faith—doxastic faith and 
fiducial faith.  Both types of faith require a positive evaluation of their object.  Audi adds that faith tends 
to eliminate negative emotions such as fear.   
It is easy to see how faith is epistemically permissible on weakly-doxastic accounts of faith, since these 
accounts don’t require that one believe the propositions in question.  And even though they require a 
positive cognitive attitude of some sort, the standards governing this attitude do not seem primarily to be 
epistemic in nature, save for the weak standard that the proposition must have some chance of being true, 
or alternatively that one not believe its negation.  However, we might hope to identify stronger epistemic 
standards concerning these attitudes, so that the norms governing them are not mostly practical or moral 
in nature.  For example, is it not better to assume or accept, of two propositions, the one that is more 
likely to be true, given one’s evidence?  Might it be epistemically superior not to accept any propositions 
at all, if one can live one’s epistemic life without doing so?  Thus, the primary epistemological question 
for these accounts is what epistemic standards govern cognitive states such as pragmatic assumption, 
acceptance, or imaginative assent—and whether the faith-propositions meet these standards, given any 
particular subject’s evidence. 
 
5. Practical Accounts of Faith 
Some authors hold that faith doesn’t primarily involve a cognitive attitude at all, but rather involves a 
commitment, choice, or action.  The faith these accounts explicate, however, may rest on cognitive 
attitudes in the sense that it would be irrational or incoherent to have faith without some particular beliefs.  
Thus, some of these accounts give rise to an epistemological question of their own: even if faith does not 
require anything like belief, is it ever rational to have the beliefs that justify the attitude that faith does 
require? 
5.1 Faith as Acting without Believing 
Pojman (1986) elucidates a view of faith as profound hope.  Hope that p requires belief in the possibility 
of p; a lack of certainty that p; a desire for p; and a disposition to do what one can to bring about p.  
Profound hope requires a particularly intense desire for p and a willingness to take great risk towards 
bringing about p.  Religious faith involves profound hope in the faith-propositions.   
This account shares some features in common with Swinburne’s (1981) pragmatist faith: pragmatist faith 
consists in acting on the assumption that p, and doing so where one has good purposes.  One can have 
such faith without believing that p.  Another possible proponent of this view is Kierkegaard, if we read 
him as primarily emphasizing action rather than belief.  For example, if we see de Silentio or Climacus as 
recommending a practical commitment to a proposition that outruns the evidence for that proposition—or 
a practical commitment even in the face of evidence that seems to tell decisively against that proposition. 
Along these lines, Cross (2003) holds that de Silentio’s Abraham has faith precisely because although his 
evidence tells him that he certainly will have done grave wrong in the act he intends, he trusts that this 
will not be so, where this trust is a ‘practical orientation towards the world’ rather than a propositional 
attitude. 
5.2 Faith as Acting without Looking for Further Evidence 
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A more recent proponent of a practical account of faith is Buchak (2012).  She holds that a proposition is 
only a potential object of faith if the individual has a pro-attitude towards p and if the evidence is not 
enough to guarantee the truth of the proposition.  Like some of the above authors, she holds that faith 
involves an element of risk: faith that p requires that one is willing to take risks on p—that one is willing 
to choose acts that do best if p is true over acts that do best if p is false.  What is distinctive about her 
view is that faith that p requires that one commit to these acts without looking for further evidence in the 
matter of p—at least, without looking for evidence for the sole purpose of deciding what to do—and to 
maintain one’s commitment even in the face of new counterevidence.  Thus, faith is a matter of stopping 
one’s search for evidence and taking action.   
Whether such faith is rational is primarily a matter of whether it is practically rational: whether stopping 
one’s search for evidence and making a commitment (or sticking to a commitment in the face of 
counterevidence) is apt to get the agent what she desires.  Buchak identifies three conditions that jointly 
entail that committing to a risky act on p without examining further evidence is superior to postponing 
one’s commitment until more evidence comes in: the subject already has a lot of evidence in the matter of 
p and on its basis she is fairly confident that p; the subject believes that any evidence she might find won’t 
conclusively tell against p; and postponing her commitment would be costly or she is risk-averse.  (There 
may be other situations in which faith in Buchak’s sense is rational.)  Thus, faith is practically rational if 
these conditions are met. 
The first two of these conditions concern the subject’s beliefs and her evidence (actual or potential), so we 
can ask whether an epistemically rational subject can meet these conditions in the case of the faith-
propositions.  (Whether closing inquiry itself is epistemically rational is beside the point, since the subject 
with faith is allowed to examine more evidence for the purposes of belief-formation, although if such 
evidence tells strongly against p, then faith that p might cease to be rational.)  Buchak holds that they will 
be met for some religious believers, but not all. 
5.3 Faith as Allegiance to an Ideal  
The final account holds that faith is not a matter of having some attitude—cognitive or otherwise—
towards a proposition.  Dewey (1934) and, following him, Kvanvig (2013) hold that faith does not 
primarily concern one’s attitude towards a proposition but rather towards an ideal.  (Discussion of Dewey 
in this section follows Kvanvig (ms.).)  There may be additional readings of Kierkegaard’s de Silentio 
that support a similar idea.  For Dewey, ‘moral faith’ consists in submission to the authority of an ideal 
end—taking that end to have a rightful claim over one’s desires and purposes—and religious faith 
consists in submission to the authority of an ideal that is so overarching that it unifies the entire self.  
What is key for Dewey is that faith is identified by the role it plays in an individual’s life, not by the 
content of any propositions.    
Does faith in this sense require anything by way of intellectual commitment? Dewey holds that the 
propositional commitments required by particular religions ought to be eliminated from such faith 
because they stifle inquiry—religion requires committing to (belief in) certain propositions regardless of 
what the evidence turns up, which is incompatible with open inquiry. Kvanvig adopts Dewey’s 
conception of faith but holds that religion—even traditional Christianity—requires no specific intellectual 
commitments.  Thus, while an individual who has faith might have intellectual commitments that are 
epistemically irresponsible, there is nothing essentially irresponsible about faith, because there are no 
intellectual commitments that are essential to it.   
On this view of faith, then, the primary locus of evaluation is the ideal itself.  This could take a number of 
forms, depending on how we think ideals are adopted and what norms govern them.  If they are, as 
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Kvanvig suggests, primarily a matter of our deepest affections, then we can ask whether those affections 
are good or understandable or beautiful.  Kvanvig thinks that a wide range of affections pass this test.  If 
ideals are primarily a matter of moral commitments—one holds an ideal because one sees the goal as 
good or worthy—then we can ask whether these commitments are indeed good, although admittedly it 
might be hard to evaluate them apart from our own ideals.  Finally, if there are any beliefs necessary to 
holding an ideal (the belief, for example, that that ideal is the best one), then these beliefs can potentially 
be evaluated epistemically. 
5.4 Epistemological (and Other) Issues for these Accounts 
What is unique about these views of faith is that they deny that faith forms any part of the chain from 
evidence to cognitive attitude.  Rather, faith is an attitude that may arise after the individual has evaluated 
the evidence she has and formed beliefs on its basis.  Faith governs how the agent responds to the world 
in action.  How, then, is faith to be evaluated, according to these views?  I have already noted that an 
agent’s practical response is generally sensitive to her beliefs: actions are only practically rational if the 
agent has certain beliefs that make them so.  In other words, faith that p doesn’t require belief that p 
(unless belief is itself a disposition to act), but the rationality of faith may rest on a belief.  Thus, we can 
ask whether these beliefs really are rational in the case of the faith-propositions.  Finally, although this is 
beyond the scope of our discussion here, a key question for these accounts that locate faith in the practical 
or moral realm is whether the attitudes they require are justified by our practical and moral norms. 
 
6. Conclusion 
One way of looking at the question of the nature of faith is to examine how the typical or ideal Christian 
arrives at his attitude towards the faith-propositions, and to locate faith in this process.  Looked at in this 
way, the central question in determining the nature of Christian faith is whether the evidence conclusively 
tells in favor of the faith-propositions.  If it does, then the defender of rational Christian faith will want to 
locate faith somewhere in the normal epistemic process of evaluating and responding to truth-directed 
reasons.  If it does not, then the defender of rational Christian faith will want to locate faith either as the 
element that takes the individual from the (inconclusive) evidence to belief in the faith-propositions, or as 
some other attitude that the Christian takes towards these propositions.   
A difficulty with starting with a view about what the evidence says, and then trying to locate faith in the 
process, is that this method typically assumes that there are (or are not) cases of rational faith, and then 
tries to explain how that could be.  But this doesn’t mean that this method cannot help with the problem 
of faith and reason.  For one, views arrived at through this method will be better to the extent that they fit 
the data we have about faith—its uses in religious texts and in contemporary language, its function in 
religious and interpersonal settings, and so forth.  For another, if the proponent of one of these views 
shows that there is some understanding of faith according to which Christian faith is rational, then she 
will have shown that there is a solution to the problem of faith and reason. 
Another way of looking at the question of the nature of faith is to start with the data we have about faith 
and to try to come up with a hypothesis about what faith is that best captures this data.  One then asks 
whether there are situations in which faith in that sense is rational or laudible, and whether Christian faith 
constitutes one of these situations.  A problem with this data-driven method is that there is potentially a 
lot of disagreement about what the data are.  For example, if many actual Christians hold the view that 
faith is belief in the absence of evidence, but hold this view because their minister unreflectively 
transmitted it and they unreflectively adopted it, what should we make of their linguistic intuitions?  
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Perhaps this poses no special problem beyond those already present in data interpretation.  But one reason 
to worry in this case is that it is not clear whether there is one enduring concept of faith throughout time. 
In any case, what is clear is that resolving the problem of faith and reason depends just as much on the 
correct analysis of faith as it does on figuring out where the evidence points in the matter of the faith-
propositions. 
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